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Hujjīyya, Belief and Acceptance

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Abstract

Hujjīyya as the most central concept of *uṣūl al-fiqh* forms almost all *uṣūlī* subjects. As understanding its meaning is quite confusing, philosophically clarifying of *hujjīyya* is aimed in this paper. First, it shall be shown that common debates in epistemology and ethics of belief are irrelevant for this purpose, because they are all about belief. Nevertheless, if “belief” is replaced with another propositional attitude, namely “acceptance”, the term “ethics of acceptance” is attained which is much more proper. Then, preferences of the latter concept upon the former shall be explained beside arguing that *hujjīyya* could be better understood this way.

Introduction

The classical, but attractive, dispute of Clifford and William James on the ethics of belief has given a contradictory status to the subject. On the one hand, it seems that we lack direct control over most beliefs. On the other hand, there is a strong intuition that ethics relates solely to the actions under our control. Therefore, by a partial change, the term “ethics of acceptance” emerges with significant differences. In this research, we want to see if the latter notion is more compatible with the concept of *hujjīyya* in Islamic Jurisprudence than the former.

Ḥujja and Ḥujjiyya in Uṣūl al-Fiqh

While some of the scholars have explained *ḥujjiyya* by quoting its literal meaning (al-Ḥāirī al-Yazdī, 1997, 356), some others have defined it more specifically as “an evidence which could be rightly used in a debate between a servant and her master” (al-Jazāyirī, 1994, 261). This definition becomes more sensible in accordance with the purpose of *fiqh* (Islamic law). As the necessity of Islamic law arises from the responsibility of human beings towards God as servants in front of their master, its purpose is providing Muslims with what makes them confident that they have done their religious duties well. (al-Ṣadr, 2015, 45)

Therefore, many jurists have defined *ḥujjiyya* by its main results which are *mu‘adhdhirīyya* (“exculpation”) and *munajjizīyya* (“inculpation”) (al-Ḥusaynī al-Ruḥānī, 1992, 69). As gaining knowledge and certain true belief about divine commands is not always possible, the product of jurisprudential inquiries might not correspond to reality and hence become false. In such cases, *ḥujja* serves as an excuse for the believer who has taken it as the basis for her actions, so that God would not blame or punish her. However, if *ḥujja* corresponds to reality, the person who has not behaved based on that *ḥujja* is blameworthy and deserves divine punishment. Respectively, these features are called *mu‘adhdhirīyya* and *munajjizīyya*.¹ While one of them gives the servant the right to defend herself in front of her master, the other gives the right to the master to condemn the servant. Therefore, this recent kind of definition has a firm connection with the previous one.

As an introduction for discussing *ḥujjiyya*, the mainstream of jurists assert that the mental state one may have toward a divine command is restricted to 1) certainty, 2) conjecture and 3) doubt². Afterwards, they start discussing *ḥujjiyya* in each of these states separately. What they consider first and as the foundation of all other debates is the rightness of relying on certainty, namely its *ḥujjiyya*. However, some have pointed out that according to a more specific definition, *ḥujjiyya* cannot be used for certainty itself and is limited to conjecture and doubt. Thereafter, they investigate different kinds of conjectures which are *ḥujja*, called *amārāt* (sg. *amāra*), and then seek what *ḥujja* is in the cases of doubt which are called *al-uṣūl al-‘amalīyya*. It is noteworthy that the conjectures which are not *ḥujja* are also regarded as doubt (al-Muzaffar, 2009, 15).

A common definition of *ḥujjiyya* restricted to *amārāt* is “assuming what is not knowledge to be knowledge in virtue of obeying the divine command” (al-Khuyī, 2001, 278) (notice that knowledge and certainty are often taken the same in the words of Islamic legal theorists, so what is not knowledge is equivalent to what is not certain). Those who have chosen this

1. If an agent opposes her *ḥujja* while it is not true and does not correspond to reality, she has committed *tajarrī*. The status of this agent, namely *mutajarrī*, is controversial among jurists. For further information see (2019).

2. For further research on doubt in Islamic law see (2015)

definition aim at extending practical reliability of knowledge to conjectures with *hujjīyya*, which means that one must act in accordance with conjectures similar to her knowledge, although she is not certain yet.

By considering the definitions of *hujjīyya* and how jurists have discussed this subject, it is obvious that *hujjīyya* of a *hujja* does not correlate with believing its content. As a result, after considering a conjecture as a reliable *hujja*, they do not take it as certain and do not differentiate between conjectures that are *hujja* and the non-*hujja* ones in being true or false. Nevertheless, the difference between an *amāra* and an unreliable conjecture is in the rightness of taking it as the basis for obeying divine commands. Consequently, a slightly different term, other than epistemic terms such as belief and justification, is necessary for explaining *hujjīyya*.

Acceptance vs. Belief

Traditionally, the term used in epistemology for analyzing “knowledge” which has been prevalent in most debates is “belief.” “The Ethics of Belief,” a more recent subject originated by William Kingdon Clifford in an essay of the same name (1877), is also formed upon the concept of belief. There is vibrant and detailed literature on the nature of this mental state, leading to several theories on this subject. Although human beings have several other mental propositional attitudes, including hope, fear, desire, etc., they are not related to the very disciplines, and consequently, they have not been studied there. However, there are mental states other than belief, such as faith and especially acceptance, which have been noticed by the scholars.

Many philosophers have used the term “acceptance” in their works; the way they comprehend and use the word vary though. Hence, the usage of the term in this paper is based on the one considered by Jonathan Cohen (1983, 1989 and 1992) and further developed by other researchers such as Michael Bratman (1992). However, it might be different from the way van Fraassen, for example, uses the word in explaining scientific inquiry (1984). As other usages are not related to this subject, they will not be discussed in this research.

Jonathan Cohen first introduced and characterized “acceptance” briefly in his commentary on Kyburg’s paper named “Belief, Acceptance and Probability” (1983) by explaining some differences between acceptance and belief. Later on, he explored the consequences of this distinction in “Belief and Acceptance” (1989). Finally, he considered various aspects of acceptance deeper and more detailed in his book “An Essay on Belief and Acceptance” (1992).

Cohen in defining acceptance writes:

to accept that *p* is to have or adopt a policy of deeming, positing, or postulating that *p*, that is, of going along with that proposition (either for the long term or for immediate

purposes only) as a premiss in some or all contexts for one's own and others' proofs, argumentations, inferences, deliberations, etc. Whether or not one assents and whether or not one feels it to be true that p. (1989, 368)

In contrast, belief by his definition "is a disposition to feel it true that p, whether or not one goes along with the proposition as a premiss." (ibid) The difference of belief and acceptance is made more specific by the way one answers the questions about her mental state. Whether one believes something is answered "by introspecting or reporting what you are disposed to feel about the matter" while the one about acceptance is answered "by making or reporting a decision" (ibid).

In his paper, Michael Bratman recognizes four prominent features of belief, differentiating it from acceptance:

(a) it is, in the sense explained, context-independent; (b) it aims at the truth of what is believed; (c) it is not normally in our direct voluntary control; and (d) it is subject to an ideal of agglomeration. In contrast, what one accepts/takes for granted (a) can reasonably vary, in ways illustrated, across contexts; (b) can be influenced by practical considerations that are not themselves evidence for the truth of what is accepted; (c) can be subject to our direct voluntary control; and (d) is not subject to the same ideal of agglomeration across contexts. (1992, 9)

Cohen also distinguishes between acceptance and mere supposition, as the former "implies commitment to a policy of premissing that p" (1989, 368), but the latter lacks such commitment. In addition, a distinction is drawn between acceptance and mere pretence, because accepting a proposition involves reasoning on the assumption of that proposition. Bratman locates acceptance between these two behaviors in a remarkable phrase: "acceptance is tied more directly to action than is mere supposition; and it is tied more directly to practical reasoning than is mere pretence." (1992, 9)

The Ḥujjiyya Debate as The Ethics of Acceptance

The ethics of belief is concerned with the question of when and in which circumstances and following what norms it is right to hold a belief. However, there are some challenges with the notion of "ethics of belief" rising from the nature of belief. One problem is about our control over our beliefs, which could briefly be stated as to whether doxastic voluntarism is true. (Chignell, 2018, ch. 3.4) According to the third feature Bratman counted for belief, we usually lack direct control over our beliefs. Therefore, the rationality of discussing ethics of something out of control seems problematic at the first sight. Another problem arises from the norms which govern beliefs. According to the second characteristic of belief, it only

aims at truth, so only epistemic norms could be applied to it, neither moral, nor prudential. (Chignell, 2018, ch. 3.2)

Nevertheless, acceptance differs from belief in these two features. First, it is by definition voluntary (Cohen 1989, 369 and 1992, 22). Second, as Cohen asserts, “the reasons for accepting that *p* need not always be epistemic ones: they might be ethical or prudential.” (1989, 369) Consequently, discussing the ethics of acceptance by several preferences would not face the previous problems.

Furthermore, based on the information given about *hujjīyya* in *uṣūl al-fīqh*, it is evident that those discussions are not about belief, because it is considered separate from the mental state one may have toward divine command (which is one’s belief about divine command). However, acceptance seems to be an appropriate alternative to belief for explaining the *hujjīyya* debate. As a result, the answer to whether something is *hujja* could be formulated as the answer to whether it is right to accept a proposition about divine commands based on that. Subsequently, the debate of *hujjīyya* could be understood as the ethics of acceptance of divine commands.

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Dasein and Choosing Authenticity

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Abstract

This paper approaches the possibility of Dasein's choosing and the meaning of its authentic choice in Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time*. Two opposite views, i.e., two interpretations of the possibility and the meaning of Dasein's choice are considered and discussed. What I think about the subject, as the conclusion, is expressed in the last part of the paper. My idea is achieved through answering to two questions: *What anxiety discloses?* and *What "Call" calls for?*

Opposite views

Hubert Dreyfus and Jane Rubin in a commentary on the second part of *Being and Time* discuss the meaning of Dasein's choice. In this commentary, while trying to link the concept of "Self" in Heidegger and Kierkegaard's thought to the concept of "authenticity", they ask such a question:

Can Heidegger lay out a secularized interpretation of the self and authenticity that, by dropping Kierkegaard's Cristian demand that each self has a world with its own differentiated meanings, shows the way of life sketched in the *Edifying Discourses* to be a workable answer to the indifference, leveling, conformism, and consequent

1. Dreyfus, Hubert L. and Rubin, Jane. (1991) "Kierkegaard, Division II, and Later Heidegger" appeared as an appendix in: Dreyfus, Hubert L. (1991) *Being-in-the-world: a commentary on Heidegger's being and time, division I*, MIT Press, pp. 283-341. This has been cited in the body of text as "D&R".

dullness of everyday life? (D&R, p. 304)

Henceforth, their discussion focuses on the “anxiety”¹ in *Being and Time*². Heidegger takes this concept from Kierkegaard but use it in a secular sense. Based on Dreyfus and Rubin, anxiety discloses to Dasein that it does not have any authentic choice and in Heidegger’s view: All “for-the-sakes-of-which”³ have been provided by culture and are for anyone. Dasein “can never acquire any possibilities of its own because it can never take over these impersonal public possibilities in a way that would make them its own and so give it an identity” (Ibid, p. 332)

In the following, Dreyfus and Rubin approach concepts of “death” and “guilt”⁴ in Heidegger. Dasein, even when not doing anything wrong, is guilty because its being is not in its own control. Only Dasein dies. Other beings perish and death is the end of existence. Anxiety discloses nothingness to Dasein. Dasein faces anxiety in two ways: fleeing of or entering to it. “Resoluteness”⁵ is an attunement⁶ fitting anxiety, and “Being toward death”⁷ is anxious kind of being. Authentic Dasein enters anxiety.

According to what has been said, Dreyfus and Rubin think there are three puzzles about the possibility of authenticity in Heidegger’s thought:

- I) How could Dasein ever choose to become authentic, given what anxiety discloses?
- II) How could authentic Dasein ever choose to take up any particular project, given what anxiety discloses?
- III) How could anything matter or be meaningful to authentic Dasein, given what anxiety discloses?

On their view, Heidegger gives convincing answers to the first two questions but his answer to the third is “indirect and not totally convincing” (Ibid).

William Bracken in a paper⁸ rejects Dreyfus and Rubin’s claim and says this claim is arose from distorting Heidegger’s text. In Bracken’s opinion:

1. Angst

2. Heidegger, Martin. *Sein und Zeit*, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen, 1953. All quotations from this book are of its English translation: Heidegger, Martin. (1996) *Being and Time*, translated by Joan Stambaugh, State University of New York Press, 1996. It has been cited with pagination for Stambaugh’s translation preceding the pagination for the german. I will cite to this book as “BT”. Note that I preferred to translate “Dasein” without hyphenation (as appeared exactly in the german text) Stambaugh hyphenates it as “Da-sein” and translate “Sein” as “Being” (not “being”).

3. Worum-willen

4. Schuld

5. Entschlossenheit

6. Befindlichkeit

7. Sein zum Tode

8. Bracken, William F. (2005) “Is There a Puzzle About How Authentic Dasein Can Act?: A Critique of Dreyfus and Rubin on *Being and Time*, Division II”, *Inquiry*, 48: 6, 533-552. I will cite to this paper as “B”.

- A) Given the account of anxiety they attribute to him [Heidegger], Dreyfus and Rubin should find this Heidegger's response to third question far worse than "not totally convincing".
- B) Their supposedly Heidegger's answers to the first two questions are not supported by the text (B, p. 533).

Bracken thinks that all three puzzles arise from their misinterpretation of anxiety [in fact, of what anxiety discloses], and the puzzles dissolve once the distortions are identified (Ibid).

Based on their concept of death in *Being and Time* (structural nullity of Dasein), Dreyfus and Rubin propose something which name it an "analogon" for the unrepresentable possibility of dying: Because in dying, there are no possibilities left, world recedes and everything is meaningless. This can be an analogon "to live lucidly in such a way that the world is constantly seen to be meaningless and I am constantly owning up to the fact that Dasein is not only the null basis as revealed in the anxiety of conscience but also is a nullity in that it can make no possibilities its own..." (D&R, p. 311).

In order to understand the analogon, I should picture myself in the death moment: I have no possibilities left; the world recedes; everything is seen to be meaningless. Then, I should see my life constantly in terms of "as if". I should make everything anxiety discloses my own.

Let's back to the three puzzles. The answer of Dreyfus and Rubin to the first and second questions (I, II) is that these questions presuppose authenticity as a matter of choice, while there is no choice. Rather, authenticity "is the experience of a transformation that comes from Dasein's accepting its powerlessness." (Ibid, p. 319).

It remains to answer to the third question. They lay this answer out in the context of tradition or "heritage" as the source of "superior possibilities" which resist "leveling power of the one (they)" (Ibid, p. 328). However, this answer flatly contradicts their prior saying that from anxiety point of view, all possibilities become indifferent and meaningless. They regard this answer as a "not totally convincing" Heidegger's answer to the third question. In Bracken's view, such an answer is far worst than "not totally convincing". This answer not only conflicts with their interpretation of anxiety, but make two first answers invalid too. According to Bracken, their assessment of Heidegger's answer to the third puzzle is conceivable in two ways:

1. Heidegger did not access to the right answer, then it reveals an inconsistency in the text;
2. Interpretation of anxiety in all three puzzles is in question (B, p. 540).

Bracken argues for the latter. Heidegger, during talking about opening world's meaninglessness in anxiety, warns his readers that while the content of any instance of the "Call"¹ is essentially particular and concrete, his analysis of what is understood in the call can only establish "the existential condition for the possibility" of any instance of the call (BT, p. 325 [280]). Bracken presents many evidences in defense of his interpretation. What fades away in anxiety is everyday mattering, not any mattering. He, eventually, sees Dreyfus and Rubin's misinterpretation of anxiety as the root cause of all puzzles (B, p. 550).

What I think

I think, the problem is that after reading this book (*Being and Time*) the reader, in any way, is faced with this question that "after all, what is the meaning of Dasein's choice?". To understand the meaning of Dasein's choice, we need to understand two things: *What anxiety discloses?* and *What "Call" calls for?*

What anxiety discloses? I think accepting powerlessness, as Dreyfus and Rubin mean it, is one aspect of what anxiety discloses to Dasein, but accepting as such does not lead to authenticity. Agreeing with Bracken, I think Dasein chooses. The point is that anxiety does not determine "for-the-sakes-of-which" existentially, but it, for the first time, provides the possibility of authentic determining of "for-the-sakes-of-which" for Dasein by individualizing it and freeing it from numerous accidental possibilities of everydayness. (BT, p. 286 [310]). The question "what should I do?" is an existentiell (ontic) one and can not be answered publically. Anxiety just reveals to Dasein that it must choose itself. Heidegger says: "Angst discloses Dasein as being-possible, and indeed as what can be individualized in individuation of its own accord." (Ibid, p. 176 [188]). The other crucial point is to note that "*that about which Angst [anxiety] is anxious is being-in-the-world itself.*" (Ibid, p. 175 [187]) and in no other way Dasein itself (Being-in-the-world) becomes anxious solely about its own self [its self vs. "They-self"²]. Then, anxiety is incomparable to any other attunes of Dasein because it is the fundamental attunement of Dasein (Ibid, p. 286 [310]). And Heidegger makes this clear in a paragraph:

It is true that it is the nature of every kind of attunement to disclose complete Being-in-the-world in all its constitutive factors (world, Being-in, self). However, in *Angst* there lies the possibility of a distinctive disclosure, since *Angst* individualizes. The individualizing fetches Dasein back from its falling prey and reveals to it authenticity and inauthenticity as possibilities of its being. The fundamental possibilities of Dasein, which are always my own, show themselves in *Angst* as they are, understood by innerworldly beings to which Dasein, initially and for the most part, clings. (Ibid,

1. Ruf

2. Man-selbst

p. 178 [190-91]).

Then, anxiety discloses to Dasein its loneliness and its urgent need to choose itself and causes Dasein to choose existentially, but does not determine what it should choose.

What “Call” calls for? Just as anxiety which does not determine “What should I do?”, call also is silent:

The call is lacking any kind of utterance. It does not even come to words, and yet it is not at all obscure and indefinite. Conscience speaks solely and constantly in the mode of silence. Thus it not only loses none of its perceptibility, but forces Dasein thus summoned and called upon to the reticence of itself. The fact that what is called in the call is lacking a formulation in words does not shunt this phenomenon into the indefiniteness of a mysterious voice, but only indicates that the understanding of “what is called” may not cling to the expectation of a communication of any such thing. (Ibid, pp. 252-253 [273-74])

As Heidegger implicitly says in this paragraph, expecting to determine publically what call calls for and taking it as a measure (Intersubjectivity) of validity or meaningfulness is illegitimate. Furthermore, “Call” is a mode of discourse. (Ibid, p. 251 [272]). Heidegger has already analyzed the structure of discourse (logos)¹ and showed that there are many steps before “statement as communication”² which are: attunement, understanding³ and interpretation (Ibid, p. 150 [160]). So, call can be shared only as a derivative mode of interpretation.

What the call discloses is nevertheless unequivocal, even if it gets interpreted in different ways in individual Dasein in accordance with its possibilities of being understood. Whereas the content of the call is seemingly indefinite, the direction it takes is a sure one and is not to be overlooked. (Ibid, p. 253 [274]).

Although Heidegger talks a lot about the content of the call (not in a determinative mode), but he notes that, at least, in any way *the direction it takes is a sure one and is not to be overlooked*. It is obvious that he refuses to talk about existentiell content of call and emphasizes on perceiving it existentially.

1. BT, Sections 32,33 and 34.

2. Aussage als Mitteilung

3. Verstehen

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Art as “playing around”: A (Later) Wittgensteinian Theory of Art

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Abstract

Post-Wittgensteinian “family resemblance” theories of art fail to capture its elusive essence because they fail to factor in what I call the “legitimate recalcitrance” inherent in art as a *practice* i.e. while creating, an artist is not in principle determined by the rules governing the arts the way, say, a chef’s cooking is determined by the rules of cooking. What then would distinguish art as a conscious human activity from other activities is the nature of the rules constituting it. I’ll be arguing for a Wittgensteinian theory of art as a language game wherein one cannot possibly make a mistake!

Introduction

“Wittgensteinian” theories of art have duly characterized art as a “family resemblance” phenomenon. “Art”, according to such a conception, “, as the logic of the concept shows, has no set of necessary and sufficient properties; hence a theory of it is logically impossible and not merely factually difficult” (Morris Weitz, 1956: 778). What has motivated this “open concept” approach towards defining art since Weitz is the apparent irredeemable heterogeneity of artworks: no sooner has a philosopher posited property *p* as the *essence* of art than an avant-garde artist comes along and creates an artifact (or performs an act) which oddly gets to be *regarded* as art yet does not have the property *p*. Weitz, therefore, concludes that “the very expansive, adventurous character of art, its ever-present changes and novel

creations, make it logically impossible to ensure any set of defining properties” (ibid: 781).

Such theories of art fail to incorporate this “adventurous character of art” mainly because they fail to factor in what I call the legitimate recalcitrance inherent in art as a practice: the fact that, while creating a work of art, an artist is not *in principle* determined by the rules governing the arts *the way*, say, a chef’s cooking is determined by the rules of culinary arts. This rule-following-informed approach to art is evident in later Wittgenstein, albeit in rather scattered notes. Drawing on these notes, in what follows, I’ll be arguing for a Wittgensteinian theory of art as a language game wherein one cannot possibly make a mistake!

Art: A “Private” (Language) Game?!

In Zettel § 320, Wittgenstein writes:

Why don’t I call cookery rules arbitrary, and why am I tempted to call the rules of grammar arbitrary? Because ‘cookery’ is defined by its end, whereas ‘speaking’ is not. That is why the use of language is in a certain sense autonomous, as cooking and washing are not. You cook badly if you are guided in your cooking by rules other than the right ones; but if you follow other rules than those of chess you are *playing another game*; and if you follow grammatical rules other than such-and-such ones, that does not mean you say something wrong, no, you are speaking of something else (Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1967: 59).

What Wittgenstein diagnoses regarding the “arbitrary” character of “the rules of grammar” also apply to the rules governing *creating* art because just like “speaking”, and unlike “cooking and washing”, art is not “defined by its end” or purpose. The very incommensurable diversity of purposes proposed by various artists and schools precludes the positing of a universally-agreed-upon purpose for art-expressing one’s innermost feelings? Furthering the cause of a socialist state? Exploring the depths of the unconscious? De-familiarizing the routine? “Despite the occasional claim”, therefore, “that it has, Art has no function or purpose, in the sense in which knives and ophthalmoscopes have functions” (William Kennick, 1958: 329).

Now, given that a “purpose” is the prospect of the satisfaction of the object of an agent’s desire in the future, one could also say that unlike all the other areas of human activity (cooking, medicine, sports, banking, entertainment, philosophy etc.), where one is guided by the prospect of the fulfillment of one’s (or a community’s) pre-determined *particular* object of desire (e.g. getting an edible item cooked, healing the patient etc.), in doing art, one is not primarily guided by the prospect of the satisfaction of such unitary objects of desire. Thus the purpose of art, if any at all, would be to make the artist fulfill their own personal purposes

(i.e. desires)! And this, in turn, would amount to saying that, to paraphrase Wittgenstein, “you cook/heal/do sports/philosophize etc. badly if you are guided in your cooking/healing/doing sports/ philosophizing etc. by rules other than the right ones; but if you follow other rules than those of art hitherto agreed upon, you are in fact doing/creating another *kind/genre* of art”.

Earlier in Zettel §294, Wittgenstein distinguishes between “a move in an existing game” and a move whereby one “establish[es] a [future] rule of the game” (ibid: 54). If a chess player starts off by moving a pawn two squares ahead, he has performed an existing move in the game-he has followed an existing rule of the game-, but if he *decides* to start off by moving the pawn three squares ahead, he has taken the first step towards establishing a new rule and possibly a new form of chess. Now, the problem is that in chess (and in sports in general) one is not allowed to *arbitrarily* change the existing rules in this way because the primary purpose of playing chess is to *compete with* one’s opponent, and one cannot compete and possibly win if the rules of the game change at either player’s discretion-here would always exist the possibility that *both* the players alter the rules of the game to their own advantage and thus never win.

In doing art, however, one is permitted and very often is encouraged to alter/ignore the rules at will-in art, the avant-garde is possible precisely because such transgressions from the rules are possible. Art at its most creative moments, that is, is constituted by moves whereby one “establish[es] a [future] rule” of a new game. *Such a legitimate recalcitrance*, as I call it, is possible within art because, unlike chess, the primary purpose of doing art is not to compete with or defeat an opponent; the artist is not looking forward to *winning against* someone.

In § 83 of the Investigations, Wittgenstein intimates a characterization of legitimate recalcitrance while describing people who are amusing themselves by playing around with a ball in all sorts of haphazard ways: “throwing the ball aimlessly into the air, chasing one another with the ball and bombarding one another for a joke and so on”. Now, in response to someone who would say that these people were following “definite rules at every throw”, Wittgenstein contends that “And is there not also the case where we play, and make up the rules as we go along? And even where we alter them-as we go along” (Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1958: 39). In light of what I have discussed so far, I suggest that there exists such a “case” (game) wherein one makes up the rules at one’s discretion as one goes along, and that is when one is engaged in *creating* art-and yes, by the same token, the people playing around with the ball in Wittgenstein’s example could be (and in modern art are) regarded as *performing* an artwork.

As such, art could be defined as a field of human activity, a “private” game¹, wherein the agent(s), while having all the hitherto established rules at his disposal, can and very often is encouraged to transgress these rules and make up new ones instead. Accordingly, because, as Stuart Hampshire once noted, “a work of art is gratuitous [, and] [i]t is not essentially the answer to a question or the solution of a presented problem” (quoted in William Kennick, 1958: 331), one could define an artwork as an unfalsifiable artifact; unlike artifacts like staplers and stethoscopes which are primarily designed to deal with practical “problems” out there, artworks are not answerable to any concerns beyond themselves and hence they can’t be demonstrated to be objectively “wrong” or “mistaken”, for “[i]n order to make a mistake,” Wittgenstein reminds us, “a man must already judge in conformity with mankind” (Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1969: 23), and artists can afford disconformity with mankind as is evidenced by their legitimate recalcitrance.

Such a conception of art would seem to conflict with Wittgenstein’s commitment to the “public” status of rules as it would imply that an artist, while creating an artwork, follows a rule “privately”! Wittgenstein addresses this concern in this following ingenious analogy:

Imagine someone following a line that serves him as a rule in this way: he holds a pair of compasses, and guides one of its points along the line that is the ‘rule’, while the other one draws the line that follows the rule. And while he moves along the rule, he alters the opening of the compasses, apparently with great precision, looking at the rule the whole time as if it determined what he did. And watching him, we see no regularity of any kind in this opening and shutting of the compasses. We can’t learn his way of following the line from him. Here perhaps we really would say: “The original seems to *intimate* to him how he has to go. But it is not a rule.” (Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1958: 87).

The reason we cannot exactly call the “line” in this example a “rule”, apart from the fact that “we can’t learn his way of following the line from him”, is that any possibility of making a mistake is eliminated here; at no point during his drawing can we stop the man and say that “Stop! You’re making a mistake here”. This is because, as Wittgenstein remarks in § 224 of *Investigations*, the concepts “agreement”, “rule” and by inference “making a mistake” are intertwined. One makes a mistake only when one contravenes a rule, and one is bound not to contravene a rule only when one has already come to an agreement with others.

Now, since the artist, upon *creating*, does not *necessarily* need to be in agreement with others in the artworld (other artists and critics) as to how to create an artwork, he can’t be bound by any public creative rules, and thus make any mistakes. This is not to say that

1. A *language* game in the case of literature.

artistic creation is not determined by any rules whatsoever; rather, one must conclude that the primary rule governing artistic creation is something like “Always follow your intuition!” This rule is as public/teachable as any other rule can get-as public as “In case you feel any discomfort, unfasten your seat belt!”; what the rule draws on (intuition), nevertheless, can only be assessed privately-similarly, one could say something to the effect that “Whatever you do with the compass, just make sure to keep one point of the compass on the line!” is actually the rule governing the man’s drawing in the above example. As such, Wittgenstein’s analogy above, in so far as in it one could substitute the “line”, which is supposed to serve as a rule, with the artist’s intuition, is an instance of artistic activity *par excellence*.

When doing art, therefore, -o use another Wittgensteinian distinction-one does not so much engage in “playing a game by rules” as “just playing around”. And this is, I argue, what distinguishes art from other human activities.

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The Finite Architect: Intelligence in Hume's Enquiry and Dialogues

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Abstract

In *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, David Hume defines intelligence as the human capacity to organize means in order to acquire ends. This paper extends Philo's reductio method in Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* to critique the notion of intelligence within the argument from design. Intelligence is integral to design and yet renders God finite, leading to the same absurdities familiar from the Dialogues Part V. Assuming that God's intelligent design made the universe, and drawing analogy between divine and human intelligence, leads to the conclusion that God is finite.

Intelligence is an attribute of God's concept that succumbs to hidden anthropomorphism. On Hume's account of intelligence, God can not be both intelligent and omniscient, all-powerful or any of the other divine attributes. Intelligence for Hume is the ability to achieve one's ends. Humans know such intelligence from experience. Drawing an analogy from human intelligence to divine intelligence, following the principle of the sole theological argument, God's intelligence is a divine ability to achieve divine ends. If God has ends external to his means or ends that have not yet been achieved then he is not unified. Such a God is not all-powerful-against fate, evil, or any other challenge to God's necessary omnipotence. The property of intelligence makes God finite.

This paper extends Philo's reductio method to critique the notion of intelligence within

the argument from design. Intelligence is integral to design and yet renders God finite, leading to the same absurdities familiar from the *Dialogues Part V*. Assuming that God's intelligent design made the universe, and drawing analogy between divine and human intelligence, leads to the conclusion that God is finite.

In *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, creativity gets synonymized with intelligence. Both give limit to the imagination, the most free faculty that humans possess yet one that may also run out of bounds to conjure useless fictions. Intelligence has a simple function. The "creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience" (Hume 1748).¹ Using this power, the mind creates ends, or goals, and means to achieve those ends. Impressions from the senses make up the material of means and ends. Hume makes immediately evident in this passage that intelligence confines the human to this world, unlike imagination, which "can in an instant transport us into the most distant regions of the universe; or even beyond the universe, into the unbounded chaos, where nature is supposed to lie in total confusion" (Hume 1748).² The imagination can extend beyond the limits of the created world but has no creative power itself. Intelligence, on the other hand, works within the limits of the created world, deriving power from materials given to the senses. Design, the capacity to create, implies intelligence and not imagination.

Means and ends go even further to suggest God's finitude. In the Enquiry 36, Hume writes "Without the influence of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses. We should never know how to adjust means to ends, or to employ our natural powers in the production of any effect." This passage comes near the end of Part 1. At the beginning of Part 2, Hume distinguishes between fiction and belief in the use of our imagination. In order to act, humans need to use the feeling of existence that underlies belief and does not underlie fiction. Elsewhere, the feeling of existence gets called an instinct.³ The feeling of existence in an actually present object carries a 'superior vivacity': "The thinking on any object readily transports the mind to what is contiguous; but it is only the actual presence of an object, that transports it with a superior vivacity" (Hume 1748).⁴ Notably, Hume goes on to say that immediate impressions can aid our imagination in construing fictions, and he uses the example of religious relics and imagery. This example complicates the picture slightly, because the religious fiction attached to the senses through a relic may seemingly lead to belief in the existence of God. Hume thinks, instead, that relics serve an end of moral betterment inspired by religious feeling,

1. *Essential Hume* 586

2. *Ibid* 586

3. *Essential Hume* 616

4. *Essential Hume* 615-6

and that humans are conscious of this practical, worldly end. Images of saints give viewers an “intimate and strong conception of those exemplary lives, which they desire to imitate” (Hume 1748).¹ Without the category of belief stemming from existent means, humans try to actualize something that only exists in the imagination, not in the real world. To act is to adjust means in order to actualize an end. Adjusting means to ends clearly requires a belief in something already existent, not a fiction, because fictions cannot be actualized. Common understanding of an intelligent designer—including the understanding of Philo and Cleanthes in the *Dialogues*—posits that if such a designer created the world, he must have done so *ex nihilo*. However, for Hume, intelligent design must follow from some prior existence on which to ground belief and subsequent means-end reasoning about the belief. Intelligent design could not create a world *ex nihilo* because intelligence depends on available, or existent, means. Nothing already existent in the world is actually infinite. Therefore, an intelligent designer God must be finite.

The debate between Demea, Philo and Cleanthes about God’s anthropomorphism in the *Dialogues IV* and *V* centers the possibility of God as a divine architect, possessing the notion of intelligence that Hume names in the Enquiry. Philo begins:

I shall endeavor to show you, a little more distinctly, the inconveniences of that anthropomorphism, which you have embraced; and shall prove, that there is no ground to suppose a plan of the world to be formed in the divine mind, consisting of different ideas,

differently arranged; in the same manner as an architect forms in his head the plan of a house which he intends to execute (Hume 1779).²

Design here means the arrangement of different ideas into a plan. Philo re-enforces the point by analogy to an architect, who uses real materials and builds according to a prior plan. The architect’s intention to execute his plan implies an end; the means to his end are physical materials and the steps of execution enumerated in the plan. Later Cleanthes argues against Philo that nature provides evidence of an intelligent designer because nature bespeaks intention and “the curious adjustment of final causes” (Hume 1779).³ A designer uses intelligence to adjust causes to desired and intended effects, or means to end.

Philo, in arguing against Cleanthes, never mentions intelligence as a strike against God’s infinity. Instead, in the *Dialogues V*, Philo follows the anthropomorphic principle as a part of God’s definition to three different absurd consequences. The first consequence is that God’s causal power be proportioned to any effect in nature, no matter how big or small.

1. *Essential Hume* 614

2. *Dialogues* 62

3. *Dialogues* 65

This “arbitrary hypothesis” (Hume 1779)¹ follows from the attempted cosmological proof, building from a finite effect to an infinite cause. Philo sees the cosmological proof as an impossible exercise because no effect can be large enough to warrant analogy to an infinite cause. Proportionally, no effect matches an infinite cause. The second consequence is that God appears imperfect. While an infinite God may be beyond human understanding, a finite God is not, and all human capacity to judge finite relations may be relevantly applied to judge the imperfections in nature. The third consequence of a finite designer is polytheism. Philo reasons that many builders make a ship, so the designer analogy may reasonably yield the conclusion that many finite gods created the world. A finite God would be arbitrary, imperfect and disunified.

Philo motivates the argument with implicit reference to God’s intelligence. Cleanthes does not immediately pick up on the problem with assenting to Philo when he insists that Cleanthes add an extra clause to his rendering of God’s mind. “Add, a mind *like the human...* the liker the better” (Hume 1779).² Twice Cleanthes agrees that God’s mind is anthropomorphic. Granting anthropomorphism to God’s mind, on my reading of intelligence, God’s mind would have to be finite. Means-end reasoning necessitates finitude for two reasons. First, an intelligent mind would be divided. Demea gives a similar objection to Cleanthes’s account of the Deity’s understanding.³ The soul of man, Cleanthes says, reasons in multiplicities, arranging ideas into certain forms and orders. Such a mind would not be perfect and simple. Second, the mind would have ends external to its means. Anything external to the mind makes the mind finite, because an actually infinite mind has no limit-no externality. Though implicit in the attack on Cleanthes, fleshing out the implications of divine intelligence for God’s finitude would provide Philo yet further support against the anthropomorphic principle.

Furthermore, this reading of intelligence in the *Enquiry* could be used against some of Hume’s statements in that text. As J.C. Gaskin points out in *Hume’s Philosophy of Religion*, the reason humans can speak of God meaningfully, for Hume, starts from reflection on the internal workings of the human mind. Gaskin quotes the *Enquiry*: “The idea of God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, wise, and good Being, arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting, without limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom” (Gaskin 1978, Hume 1748).⁴ This God is not a first cause, immaterial substance or origin of worlds. Even so, the idea of an intelligent God lacks coherence. Intelligence necessitates a limit, an end toward and against which means can be organized. Wisdom as a quality

1. *Dialogues* 68

2. *Dialogues* 68

3. *Dialogues* 61

4. *Essential Hume* 587 and *Hume’s Philosophy of Religion* 99

derived from intelligence cannot be augmented without limit and still be meaningfully called goodness. Meaning empiricism provides a way out of the quandary. God may meaningfully possess the attribute of intelligence, an idea arising from reflection on experience of the wise workings of the human mind. That intelligent God, however, would be finite. Divine attributes need not—because they cannot—be augmented without limit. The ‘prove yourself!’ challenge which Gaskin names against alleged religious ideas with no ground in experience echoes Demea’s challenge to Cleanthes: “consider what it is you assert, when you represent the Deity as similar to a human mind and understanding” (Hume 1779).¹ The result for meaning empiricism, on consideration, is that infinity as an attribute of God² has no proof and God’s idea remains meaningful only in reference to a finite entity.

This paper has argued that Hume’s conception of intelligence from *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* may be applied to the debate about God’s finitude in the *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part V* to give further proof supporting Philo’s argument against anthropomorphism.

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1. *Dialogues* 60-61

2. Infinity in other contexts would also have no meaning, as Philo convincingly argues in the *Dialogues V*.

Perspectivism About Special Relativity

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Abstract

According to the special theory of relativity, such properties as length, time duration, and simultaneity are relative to the reference frame of the observer. The question of this paper is if special relativity coheres with perspectivism, saying that reality can only be described from perspectives and that an objective image of reality is unattainable. I argue that a reference frame is a perspective, provided that perspectival means being conditional. Also, the absoluteness of the speed of light can be understood perspectivally. Finally, with the aid of the concept of robustness, I defend a perspectival realism about special relativity.

Introduction

Perspectivism has recently been developed by such philosophers of science as Ronald Giere (2006; 2013; 2016), Bas van Fraassen (2008) Paul Teller (2012; 2020) and Michela Massimi (2012; 2018). Although different articulations of perspectivism are presented in the literature, its main idea is that our scientific knowledge is partial or conditional.

In this paper, I ask whether a perspectival reading of the special theory of relativity is defensible. In part II, I argue that inertial reference frames can naturally be considered perspectives, if perspectival means “being conditional” rather than “being partial”. In part III, I argue that the absoluteness of the speed of light can also be interpreted perspectivally.

In parts IV and V, I employ the concept of robustness to develop a realist perspectivism about special relativity.

I should clarify in advance that in the discussion of perspectivism my concentration is on Giere's view. I also focus on the absoluteness of the speed of light when I speak of absoluteness, while the absoluteness of the laws of physics can also be discussed in a similar vein.

Perspective in Special Relativity¹

Two postulates of the special² theory of relativity are as follows: (1) The laws of physics are invariant in all inertial (i.e., non-accelerating) frames of reference. (2) Irrespective of the motion of the reference frame of the observer or the light source, the speed of light in vacuum is constant for all observers. The second postulate, which historically achieved wide acceptance after the Michelson-Morley experiment, leads to the Lorentz transformations, which transform frames of reference such that the speed of light remains constant. These transformations have some implications: Properties such as length, time duration, and simultaneity, in addition to position and speed, are all relative to the reference frame of the observer. Simultaneity, for instance, depends on the choice of frame. It may be that in frame₁, event₁ occurs after event₂; in frame₂, event₁ occurs before event₂; and in frame₃, event₁ and event₂ occurs simultaneity. Accordingly, simultaneity is *conditional* on the frame of reference.

The concept of "reference frame" is central to special relativity. A reference frame is an observational perspective in space from which a property is measured. A question is whether the "frame of reference" can be an example of "perspective" in its philosophical sense. I focus on Giere's conception of perspective to answer the question. He starts his argument concerning perspectivism by asserting that human vision is perspectival, in the sense of being *partial*.

For my purposes, maybe the most important feature of perspectives is that they are always partial. When looking out at a scene, a typical human trichromat is visually affected by only a narrow range of all the electromagnetic radiation available (2006, p. 35).

Then, he extends his arguments, asserting that scientific observations are also partial. That is, each observational instrument or detector responds to a specific feature of reality. For instance, a radio telescope receives only radio waves, and a gamma telescope is sensitive only to gamma rays. Giere goes further and argues that scientific models are also partial. Only some features of a phenomenon are represented in a model, and others are eliminated.

1. I rely on Kosso (1998) in explaining philosophical characteristics of special relativity.

2. The theory is "special" as it is valid where the gravitational and quantum effects are insignificant. Accelerating frames of reference and gravitational effects are considered in general relativity. Also, the quantum as well as gravitational effects are taken into account in quantum gravity. The scope of the current paper is confined to special relativity. Nevertheless, the results may also be applicable to other theories.

In this regard, models are similar to maps. “Maps are *partial*. Only some features of the territory in question are represented” (2006, p. 73, see also pp. 76-78)

Another meaning of perspective for Giere is being *conditional*. According to him, the strongest claims a scientist can legitimately make are of a qualified, conditional form: “According to this highly confirmed theory (or reliable instruments), the world seems to be roughly such and such.” There is no way legitimately to take the further objectivist step and declare *unconditionally*: “This theory (or instrument) provides us with a complete and literally correct picture of the world itself.” (Giere, 2006, pp. 5-6, emphases added)

In what sense can reference frames of special relativity be considered as perspectives? It seems odd to maintain that an observer in a reference frame *partially* represents what is measured, in the similar way that Giere speaks of the “partiality” of perspectives. An observer in a frame of reference is not sensitive only to a feature of the object when the observer is measuring, say, the length of an object. When we see an astronomical object by different telescopes, each of them provides us with a feature of the object. These different features are all incomplete, but each augments our understanding of the object. However, in special relativity, if an observer measures the length of an object from other frames, further features of the object are not measured. The same feature (length) is measured from different frames.

For Giere, the notion of “partial” seems to be interconnected with that of “conditional”. A perspective is conditional on the partial features that can be represented by bodily apparatuses, experimental instruments, or scientific models. However, I think that the concept of perspectival as “being conditional” is more inclusive than that as being partial. Particularly, regarding our discussion of frames, perspective in the meaning of being *conditional* suitably match the concept of reference frame in special relativity. One can naturally say that on condition that one observes from the frame₁ the length of the object A is L_1 ; on condition that one observes from the frame₂ the length is L_2 , and so on. Also, no measurement of the length can be made unconditionally, from nowhere. Therefore, if perspectival means being conditional on a perspective, a reference frame is a perspective.

Absoluteness in Special Relativity

Conceptualizing reference frames as perspectives might seem problematic, because according to the postulates of special relativity, the laws of physics and the speed of light in vacuum are not dependent on the reference frame of the observer. They are absolute, independent of all reference frames.

In reply, one can argue that the two postulates themselves provide a theoretical perspective to understand the physical world. Those postulates (and their absolute properties, i.e., the speed of light and the laws of physics) are the conditions of the constitution of special relativity. On *condition* that those postulates are true, the physical world is in the way that special relativity describes. Accordingly, when an observer measures a relative property

such as length, two perspectives are employed. First, the world is seen from the theoretical perspective of the two postulates (and their absolute properties). Second, the observational perspective of that frame of reference is at work. Accordingly, absoluteness should not be considered as being independent of all perspectives. It is being only independent of the perspectives of reference frames.

In particular, regarding the second postulate, the speed of light is articulated in an idealized form, in the perfect vacuum—an unavailable condition in our messy world.

The speed of light, for example, shows up in several different theoretical perspectives, including special relativity and quantum theory. Although the value of the constant, c , is determined by measurement, the definition is theoretical, the speed of light in a perfect vacuum. It is a constant in an idealized model. Our best theories tell us that there are no perfect vacuums to be found anywhere in the universe. So-called empty space is full of all kinds of “space dust.” If it were not, we could see a lot further with optical telescopes than we can in fact see. (Giere, 2006, p. 92)

One might, however, argue that both postulates of special relativity have been empirically confirmed and not refuted so far. Therefore, they are not theoretical perspectives but empirical facts. Different earth-based or astronomical setups have thus far measured the speed of light (as well as other electromagnetic waves or massless particles). Thus, they provide a *robust evidence* that the speed of light is absolute.

In response, it can be argued that the speed of light is absolute *according* to some experimental setups. Absoluteness is *conditional* on those experimental setups, and this conditionality supports perspectivism. It is still feasible that in an unexamined domain, with a novel experimental setup, it turns out that the speed of light is not always absolute. Accordingly, the absoluteness should not be read objectively (objective in the sense of being non-conditional or non-perspectival). In the next part, I further discuss the role of “robust” evidence in the epistemology of science.

Robustness or Overlapping Perspectives

The concept of robustness attracts attention in recent philosophy of science. William Wimsatt (2007) argues that if a thing is robust, i.e. if it is empirically accessible in a number of independent ways, then it is real. Marcus Eronen thus presents an unambiguous definition: “X [a scientific entity, a property, a phenomenon, or even an ordinary object] is robust in the relevant scientific community at a certain time insofar as X is detectable, measurable, derivable, producible, or explanatory in a variety of independent ways” (2015, p. 3967). Such robust realists as Wimsatt and Eronen argue for realism on the basis of robustness.

Independent terrestrial or astronomical setups demonstrate that the speed of light is

absolute. Each of these setups can be considered an observational perspective, in the very sense that Giere sees scientific instruments as perspectives. When several observational setups manifest a similar fact, “overlapping instrumental perspectives” are available that present a robust evidence. This is totally acceptable. Nevertheless, our knowledge of a robust fact is still *perspectival*.

It is a commonplace that there can be many observational perspectives of the same objects. ... Is this not good evidence that there is something “objectively” there? Indeed, this is good evidence that there is something there, but this need not be understood as knowledge in an “absolute objectivist” sense.

The simple but fundamental point is that to be an object detected in several different perspectives is not to be detected in no perspective whatsoever. All observational claims made about the object are made in some perspective or other. (Giere, 2006, pp. 57-58)

Giere considers the evidence achieved from overlapping perspectives or what robust realists call robust evidence as “good evidence”. Both Giere and robust realists seem avoid assuming that such evidence are objectively true. Eronen’s qualification that robustness is discovered in a “relevant scientific community at a certain time” allows that a robust evidence in current scientific communities at the current time may turn out to be untrue in the domains that have so far been uninvestigated. If one takes it that the absoluteness of the speed of light is an empirical fact, the possibility that the speed may not be absolute in a currently unfamiliar domain should not be closed. However, if one considers the absoluteness of the speed of light as a non-perspectival, objective fact, one should take it that the absoluteness is an a-priori knowledge irrefutable by (future) empirical evidence. Accordingly, one is supposed to consider the second postulate the a-priori condition of special relativity, which itself, as argued earlier, leads to perspectivism.

Robust Perspectivism

The role of robustness or overlapping perspectives is not essential to the epistemology of Giere’s perspectivism. He introduces overlapping perspectives as an “important methodological strategy” (2006, p. 58) that can provide “good evidence”. He indeed discusses this issue not to develop his epistemological thesis, but to defend it against overlapping perspectives.

However, I would like to go beyond him and suggest that “robustness” can explain the “realist” side of perspectival realism. Robust evidence is not objective, in that sense of being non-perspectival, because future discoveries may demonstrate that our current robust evidences are only true according to our currently available observational and theoretical perspectives, not according to other relevant to-be-perspectives. At the same time, we are currently justified to believe in robust evidences, because they are true according to our

current multiple independent perspectives. Explaining realist side of perspectival realism by robustness (or overlapping perspectives) can support perspectival realism against the criticism that it reduces to epistemological relativism. I call this version of perspectival realism, whose realist side depends on the concept of robustness, robust perspectivism.

What is the implication of robust perspectivism for our discussion of the absoluteness of the speed of light? Firstly, the absoluteness coheres with perspectivism. If absoluteness is an a-priori concept, it should be interpreted as an idealized notion that makes possible the constitution of special relativity, so it contributes to providing a theoretical perspective. If the absoluteness is interpreted empirically, so the speed of light is absolute according to some independent experimental setups, therefore, absoluteness is *conditional* on those setups, and this conditionality supports perspectivism. Secondly, the absoluteness also coheres with the “robust” side of robust perspectivism. The absoluteness of the speed of light is a robust fact, because it is measurable by independent empirical setups. Besides, arguably it is explanatory in such independent theories as special relativity and quantum mechanics.

In conclusion, I have argued for robust perspectivism, which explains both relativity and absoluteness of special relativity.

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Conceptual Reduction without Necessary and Sufficient Conditions: A Truthmaking Approach

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Abstract

Conceptual reductive accounts usually take conceptual reduction to be possible iff necessary and sufficient conditions for the truths of one domain can be given by describing truths in another domain, and thus reducing the former to the latter. Instead, I will argue that another kind of conceptual reduction does not give necessary and sufficient conditions for the conceptual reduction of an entity, but it provides another way that conceptual reduction can be done. I will argue that we can do this kind of reduction, if there are various less-than-perfectly similar physical properties that can be the truthmakers of sentences about higher-level properties and the similarity between them can explain why an irreducible higher-level property is not needed.

Conceptual reductive accounts usually take conceptual reduction to be possible iff necessary and sufficient conditions for the truths of one domain can be given by describing truths in another domain, and thus reducing the former to the latter. For example, reductionism about the mind is true iff for each mental predicate *M*, there is a physical predicate *P* such that a sentence of the form ‘*x* is *M* iff *x* is *P*’ is analytically (Armstrong, 1968, 1970, 1977; Lewis, 1966/1983, 1972, 1980/1983, 1994; Kim, 2005) or empirically (Block & Stalnaker, 1999; Hill, 1991; Hill & McLaughlin, 1999; McLaughlin, 2001) true. This is what I call a strong conceptual reduction (SCR).

A view that claims that reductive claims are analytical truths is the a priori entailment view of reduction (i.e., the conceptual entailment view of reduction: see Chalmers, 1996, 2002/2011; Jackson, 1994, 1998; Chalmers & Jackson, 2001). According to it, physicalism is true, iff every truth is conceptually entailed by PTI (P: physical truths, T: that's all truth, I: indexical truths) truths. More generally, conceptual reduction is possible, only if conceptual entailment is possible. We can conceptually entail a phenomenal truth Q from PTI, iff Q can be derived a priori (i.e., using only logic and conceptual truths) from PTI. Armstrong (1968, 1970, 1977), Lewis (1966/1983, 1972, 1980/1983, 1994) and Kim (2005) are reductive physicalists that endorsed the a priori entailment view of reduction¹.

A view, which claims that reductive claims are empirical truths, is the a posteriori entailment view of reduction (see Block & Stalnaker, 1999; Hill, 1991; Hill & McLaughlin, 1999; McLaughlin, 2001). According to it, physicalism is true, iff every truth is entailed by PTI truths + methodological principles. For example, we reduce pain to the firing of C-fibres because every time someone is in pain, C-fibres fire, and the simplest explanation why this is the case is that pain is identical to the firing of C-fibres.

Instead, I will argue that another kind of conceptual reduction is possible. I will call 'weak conceptual reduction' (WCR) any conceptual reductive account that does not give necessary and sufficient conditions for the conceptual reduction of an entity, but it provides another way that conceptual reduction can be done. Weak conceptual reduction (WCR) can be given by using resources from Heil's (2003, 2012) truthmaker theory. I will argue that we can do this kind of reduction, if there are various less-than-perfectly similar physical properties that can be the truthmakers of sentences about higher-level properties and the similarity between them can explain why an irreducible higher-level property is not needed.

My conceptual reductive account is weak because it allows for infinite possible or actual truthmakers for a higher-level predicate and involves the notion of similarity. Unlike SCR, it does not attempt to present all the possible truthmakers without mentioning anything else. For example, consider the predicate 'm' that purports to refer to the mental property of being happy. It can be weakly conceptually reduced in the following way: An object O possesses m, iff it possesses p_1 or p_2 or p_3 or any other similar physical property.

There is not only one way of conceptually reducing m. m could be reduced because as above, we know that p_1 , p_2 , and p_3 are actual truthmakers of sentences about m. m could also

1. More precisely, Kim (2005) is reductive physicalist about every higher-level property except phenomenal properties. He thought that phenomenal properties cannot be defined functionally, and therefore, they cannot be reduced to functional physical properties that satisfy the same causal role as the phenomenal properties. He followed Levine (1993) and Chalmers (1996) and argued that phenomenal properties are not functional properties. Instead, each phenomenal property is defined by its sensory quale. In other words, intrinsic qualities of qualia are not functionalisable and therefore are irreducible. This view presupposes that physical properties are not qualitative or intrinsic but see Stoljar (2006) and Heil (2003, 2012) for reasons to believe that this is not the case.

be conceptually reduced, if we knew other truthmakers of sentences about m (e.g., p_4 , p_5 , and p_6). So, the biconditional “An object O possesses m , iff ...” can be completed in different ways.

I introduced my account of conceptual reduction without distinguishing between tokens and types of properties. On some occasions, we may know several tokens of physical properties that are truthmakers of sentences about a higher-level entity, but they all belong to the same physical type. Cases of conceptual reduction that include several truthmakers, like the example above, may be more available, when we think of tokens of properties rather than types of properties. For example, we may be able to conceptually reduce ‘being in pain’ in several different tokens of physical properties of humans. Still, they all belong to the same type because all ways for humans to be in pain belong to one type. This may be the case even though there are small differences between tokens of being in pain (slightly different neurons fire). We may not know which exactly are the truthmakers of sentences about animals that are in pain, but we may still be able to do the conceptual reduction because examining philosophically and scientifically the human brain and the theory of evolution gave us good reasons to believe that mental properties of every species are ontologically reducible to the physical.

If a higher-level entity, is conceptually reduced to various less-than-perfectly similar physical entities, not any similarity between different truthmakers is relevant. A variety of properties can be similar in virtue of being located in Earth. But that is not what we are looking for when we attempt to conceptually reduce something. We are not concerned with similarity *simpliciter*. We are concerned with similarity about certain respects. In the case of being happy, we are concerned with similarity in respects that make it the case that whenever someone has a physical property similar enough with certain physical properties, it is correct to describe them as ‘being happy’ even if there is no irreducible property of being happy. We attempt to find out the similar respects that make it the case that a mental phenomenon does not need to be something over and above the physical¹. “Respects” should not be understood as properties of properties or aspects of properties. Respects are what we get when we abstract from particular properties and focus on certain ways to partially consider these properties.

The relevant similarities may be structural similarities². It may be correct to describe different animals as ‘feeling pain’ because they possess less-than-perfectly similar structural properties. Their simples are arranged in less-than-perfectly similar ways and that is why they have less-than-perfectly similar structural properties.

1. There may be other reasons to postulate the existence of irreducible mental properties. But given the lack of such reasons, these physical similarities give us a reason to reduce the mental to the physical.

2. They may also be qualitative similarities in the case of phenomenal properties. This is compatible with physicalism, if physical properties are powerful qualities (see Heil, 2003, 2012).

My WCR account has the advantage over Heil's truthmaker theory that it explains precisely why certain higher-level entities are nothing over and above physical entities. It lists several physical properties and shows that the similarity between them explains why a higher-level phenomenon can be reduced to several less-than-perfectly similar physical phenomena. The combination of a truthmaker theory with either the a priori entailment view or the a posteriori entailment view, which results to WCR, is the best way to explain why a higher-level entity is an ontologically free lunch.

There is another difference between weak conceptual reduction (WCR) and strong conceptual reduction (SCR). WCR, unlike SCR, can be incomplete. That is, while SCR has to mention all the actual physical properties that can be truthmakers of a mental predicate, WCR does not. Knowing some actual physical properties that are truthmakers for higher-level predicates is all we need for making translation possible. We can weakly conceptually reduce a higher-level predicate to physical predicates, if we know enough truthmakers of the higher-level predicate that make us realise what is the similarity between them and what other possible truthmakers of this predicate should be like to be truthmakers of this predicate.

While some reductive views are one-to-one, WCR is one-to-many. The difference is about truthmakers. Consider type identity theory; an example of one-to-one reductive view. According to it, a mental property m is reduced to a physical property p , iff m occurs iff p occurs. If this reduction is possible, a mental predicate about m has only one actual and possible truthmaker.

However, WCR is a one-to-many reductive view. That is, one predicate has or can have multiple truthmakers. For example, 'being happy' can have many actual or possible physical truthmakers.

To sum up, I have proposed a new account of conceptual reduction (WCR). According to it, we can conceptually reduce a higher-level property to various less-than-perfectly similar physical properties, if the similarity between them explains why this higher-level property is not something distinct from them (it's high only concerning levels of abstraction/description, not levels of being). The notion of similarity is used to conceptually reduce certain entities, and this motivates us to believe that these entities are ontologically reduced to the physical. Using WCR can help us to argue against the multiple-realizability argument and for the multiple-truthmakers argument.

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Fundamental Scientific Theories and the Problem of Metaphysical Impartiality: Comments on Stenmark's Response to Golshani

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Abstract

In Vol. 3, No. 1 of the journal *Theology and Science*, a discussion took place between Mehdi Golshani and Mikael Stenmark on the concept of “Theistic Science.” The core disagreement that appeared through their exchanges is that Stenmark maintains that a value-free science at the level of justification is not only possible, but actually occurs; whereas this idea is exactly what Golshani disputes. I will explore two of the critiques Stenmark presented in his counter-response, then I will examine his example of an impartial fundamental science. Finally, I will assess Stenmark's notion of ‘religiously relevant science.’

Science and the Significance of Metaphysical Frameworks

In his response, Stenmark argues that “we can find scientists with naturalist or theistic inclinations on both sides of the debate [i.e. Big Bang supporters and Steady State supporters] suggesting a process of validation in which presuppositions of theistic or anti-theistic convictions play no decisive role.” (Stenmark 2005b) Of course, both sides tries to justify their theories with different inclinations; and as long as they carry out regular scientific activity, namely data-gathering and analysis, the discourse is purely descriptive and, in a sense, scientific. However, the underlying extrapolation appears when both sides express their results in a way that cannot be admitted or even conceived without taking metaphysical

steps. It is true that at this point, the empirical data can be used for or against SS hypothesis, regardless of the theologically-relevant metaphysical presuppositions (and, as we know, at this level SS theory failed to resist criticisms.) But, even if one accepts that the universe is temporally eternal for the sake of argument, the jump from “a temporally eternal universe” to “an ontologically self-sufficient universe” cannot be taken without a metaphysical add-on. That is because such a conclusion entails an important meta-scientific presupposition, namely the fact that ontological temporality is the only criterion for non-self-sufficiency. Likewise, if one jumps from BB theory to the non-self-sufficiency of the universe, one also presumes that ontological temporality is, at a minimum, one of the signs of the need for an external cause.

The reason why this is the case is that if one wants to deduce the need and dependency of something on an external cause from the universe having a beginning, one needs to extend his/her conception of causation from its ordinary empirical sense, which is that ‘every event in the universe is caused by a *previous* event.’ To explain, if what is meant by the term ‘universe’ in this context includes space-time itself, then, it does not make sense to talk about a temporally prior cause of the universe; since such an assumption entails a temporally prior cause of time itself. Therefore, a metaphysical step regarding the concept of causation is required even in order to pose any question about the origin of the universe as a whole, which includes time itself. Thus, in order to give any coherent picture of the origin of a temporally-limited universe, one must already extend one’s concept of causation into a kind of cause which does not necessarily *precede* its effect in terms of time. To be more precise, one can say that one must already have a conception of causality in which the relations between a cause and the temporal parts of its effect are the same in terms of time.¹

The upshot is that *both* sides of the scientific debate in question are equally taking meta-scientific assumptions into account in order to fit their scientific results into the structure of reality. The difference between Stenmark and Golshani does not revolve around the possibility of an impartial science. Golshani also admits that science can be impartial in terms of the religiously-relevant metaphysical principles. Nonetheless, for him, this can happen only in a context where science does not aim to address fundamental questions, namely the types of questions that address the origin or the nature of reality, the purpose of the universe, the meaning of human life, etc.

1. This kind of conceptual extension is required also in other domains of knowledge; e.g. in the realm of action theory in which any meaningful explanation of human action calls for an extended conception of causation which encompasses “reasons for action” including both volitional and doxastic states of a conscious agent.

Stenmark's Example of an Impartial Science

At the end of his counter-response, Stenmark proffers evolutionary theory as an example of a metaphysically neutral fundamental theory that undermines a religious belief. (Stenmark 2005b) The question is: which religious belief in particular is supposed to have been undermined by evolutionary theory? There can be two possible interpretations of 'a religious belief' in this context.

The first possible interpretation is the following: 'Darwinian evolution undermines the theistic metaphysical view in its totality i.e. the core idea of the existence of a cosmic creator and designer upon which both the existence and subsistence of all natural entities and phenomena-including biological organisms-depend. This interpretation will be challenged from a certain point of view in this section. The second possible interpretation of a religious belief that is supposedly undermined by evolutionary theory is the non-worldviewish minor belief that 'the species we find on earth did not actually evolve from common ancestors.' If this is what Stenmark means, it will be dealt with in the fourth section at length.

Now let us proceed to examine in greater detail the first possible interpretation. In a nutshell, for the theory of evolution to disprove or undermine the existence of any creator or sustainer, God must be preconceived as a 'god of the gaps' i.e. a sort of god who intervenes in the natural world *from outside the regularities of its phenomena*. Hence, only the ones who believes that God's agency already became restricted by the discovery of, say, Newtonian laws, can hold that evolutionary theory also debunks the existence or the agency of God. Otherwise, the laws of evolution can be understood simply as a set of predetermined regularities alongside other laws of nature. Both aspects of the evolutionary process (mutation/selection) occur only because there are certain features and properties residing in the nature of biological entities. These properties are discovered or formulated by science as structures of natural laws. The theological challenge of evolution is not different from that of Newton's theory of motion and the issue ultimately turns back to the seventeenth century confusion as to whether natural laws essentially limit, remove, or replace the need for any supernatural creator or sustainer.

Stenmark and the Idea of Religiously Relevant Science

Stenmark also puts forth the notion of "religiously relevant science." What he means is that "science has the potential to undermine (or support for that matter) any religious or ideological idea that has empirical content or presupposes the truth of some empirical statements" because investigating empirical claims is the proper domain of science. As an example, Stenmark states that science has discovered that the earth is billions of years old and thus, refuted the biblical belief that God created the earth around 6000 years ago.

(Stenmark 2005a:5-6)

What Stenmark sketched out along these lines is known in the Islamicate philosophical tradition as the issue of the “conflict between rational and religious belief.” It is difficult to assign a single position on this issue to all Muslim scholars of all schools of thought, but a widely accepted view amongst Muslim philosophers is that “there is no general rule in such conflicting situations.” This is because not all rational beliefs have the same degree of epistemic value, considering the arguments upon which they are founded. Furthermore, not all scriptural statements have an equal degree of clarity and explicitness, especially when one is supposed to take the whole scripture *en masse* into account in order to determine the religious point of view on a particular subject. Therefore, in each conflicting case, one needs to estimate the epistemic and denotative strength of both sides and then choose the stronger one. An example of such a trade-off approach can be seen in Ibn-Sina in his *Risālat al-Adawīyya* where he argues in favour of the spiritual resurrection. Here, although Ibn-i Sīnā admits that bodily resurrection is more consonant with the surface meaning of the Quranic verses, the rational arguments on the impossibility of the body’s return (*ma’ād*) leads us to interpret these verses against their exterior and apparent meaning (*zāhir*)¹. (Ibn-Sina, 2004:102)

The previous example of evolutionary theory can be understood in similar terms. It must be stated that such a minor belief about the nature of the mechanism that is purported to have shaped the development of living organisms is not a cornerstone of religious belief systems. Furthermore, this belief is conceptually capable of being evaluated by the empirical method of science. As we have shown, scientifically discovered mechanisms of nature can be interpreted in a theistic metaphysical framework, and therefore, the central theistic view on the world still remains, irrespective of whether or not species share a common ancestry. The only difference that evolutionary theory can make within the theistic interpretive framework is with respect to the *type* of mechanisms through which God’s agency operates in nature.

However, although such a minor belief *per se* does not affect the core theistic belief, Stenmark is right when he emphasizes the point that the idea of a common ancestry of species is religiously relevant. This is not because this belief affects a central theistic belief, but because it seems to contradict certain verses in the scriptural text, which are apparently addressing empirically-testable, or at least, empirically-theorizable facts; i.e. the history of species in terms of their ancestry. As previously outlined, the accepted approach among the Islamic philosophers in these cases is a trade-off strategy: “In a case where ‘conjectural revelation’ (whose literal purport is not precise and clear but is based on interpretation and conjecture) has a general applicability and is found to be contradicted by certain rational

1. For more info about this terminology, see: (Williams, 2017:111)

evidences, the general application of ‘conjectural revelation’ (be it based on verses of the Qur’an or on the prophetic traditions or on the traditions of the Imams) must be abandoned. This is because “conjectural evidence” (*dalil zanni*) can never be maintained when ‘definitive evidence’ (*dalil qat’i*) is available.”¹ Consequently, rational discoveries-including scientific ones-may function as circumstantial evidences (*qarīneh*) for interpreting scriptural statements about empirically-testable facts.

In the light of the abovementioned approach, alongside the duality that Golshani proposed between the fundamental and regular levels of scientific theorizing, one can differentiate between two domains of scripture-based and reason-based beliefs. Considering the content of major religions, one can realize that the main domain of religious beliefs covers what is referred to in current discussions as the fundamental questions, such as the question about the origin of existence, the nature of human existence, the meaning and the ultimate purpose of life, the attainment of happiness, etc. If we look closely at the purely scientific approaches to these sorts of questions, we will recognize that the proposed science-based answers are not as conventional and acceptable as usually expected from an “empirically objective” science. This is, in part, because of the point that Golshani made about the metaphysics-ladenness of fundamental scientific theories, and also because of the involvement of other kinds of human experiences in the process of formulating, posing, and thinking about these questions. Hence, at the level of fundamental questions, which are also related to the pivotal principles of religious belief systems, science does not function in its fully unbiased and impartial manner. Therefore, the idea of a religiously relevant and yet neutral science that is supposed to obtain impartial results relevant to these fundamental questions-and therefore a science that undermines or supports religious answers to those questions-is not a plausible suggestion. Nonetheless, it must be admitted that Stenmark has a point with regards to-what I would rather call-the secondary scriptural statements which address empirical or empirically testable claims i.e. the main domain of regular science. Regular scientific theorizing-as an exemplar of rational knowledge-does have its authority and plausibility in this domain. By considering the epistemic and denotative strength of both sides (following the trade-off methodology of the Islamic philosophers), one must make a balance between regular scientific theories and the possible meanings of scriptural statements.

1. See: Javadi-Amoli, Abdollah, trans. Shahyar Sa>adat, *Divine Revelation, Human Reason and Science* in <https://www.al-islam.org/al-tawhid/vol1-n2/divine-revelation-human-reason-and-science-abdullah-jawadi-amuli>

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Spinoza's concept of Monism and Sankaracarya's Concept of Monism: a Comparative Study

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Abstract

The term 'Monism' represents the philosophical thought in which oneness of reality is accentuated. Though the philosophers from different backgrounds practised their philosophy from the same monistic standpoint but their monistic outlook is not same with each other. This paper tries to draw a comparison of the monistic view of Spinoza with that of Śaṅkarācārya's Advaita concept. In this analysis, Spinoza's substance theory and Advaita concept of Śaṅkarācārya have been examined separately. This study ends with this conclusion that in comparison to Spinoza, Śaṅkarācārya is able to retain his monistic position till the end.

Introduction

Monism is that ism put forwarded by the thinkers in order to substantiate one reality. Simply put, monism is the concept which stands against any idea of dichotomy. Many Indian as well as Western thinkers have assimilated the concept of monism in their philosophy. Though they have practised their philosophy from the same monistic view but in reality their monistic outlook is not same with each other. So this paper tries to have a comparative vision between monistic view of Spinoza and Śaṅkarācārya's concept of monism. Spinoza, the great thinker of Modern Western Philosophy, initiates his monistic view by opposing

the dualistic thought originated by Descartes. To some extent Spinoza was succeed in his mission. On the other hand, Śāṅkarācārya, the great pioneer of Advaita Vedānta, raised a strong revolution by his monistic thought in the Eastern Philosophy. Let us see how these two great legends encapsulated their thoughts in monistic frame work.

Monism in the philosophy of Spinoza

The flaw detected in the notion of substance propagated by Descartes incites Spinoza to introduce monistic trend in his philosophy. I think it would not be wrong to hold that monistic thought of Spinoza is engendered by the dualism pervaded in Descartes' Philosophy. The alliance of Spinoza's monistic view with his concept of substance necessitates the profound look into the whole theory of substance of Spinoza. Let us proceed to have a glance at the doctrine of Spinozistic substance which will assist us in acquainting the concept of monism of Spinoza's philosophy.

Spinoza defines substance as-'By substance I mean that which is in itself and conceived through itself i.e. that the conception of which does not need the conception of any other thing in order to its formation.' (Sengupta 2012, p.37) The preposition 'in' used in the definition of substance exposes the fact that substance is that which logically depends on itself. Second indication of this definition is that no other conception helps us in the conceptualization of substance. We have to acknowledge it only in reference to itself to itself. In a nutshell, substance is an independent infinite principle. Self reliance nature of substance exonerates the fact that substance is one. Independent nature of Spinoza's substance entails monism. Thus Descartes' dualism comes to end. The presence of more than one substance gives rise to the restriction among substances which challenges the independent nature of substance. Thereby monism comes into existence in the philosophy of Spinoza. This one substance is equated with God. By defining God, Spinoza says, "Being absolutely infinite, that is, substance consisting in infinite attributes each of which express eternal and infinite essence." (Masih 2010, p.225) This God is identified with Nature.¹ Substance as self-reliance principle is presented as *Natura Naturans* and as a creative product it is designated as *Natura-Naturata*. Spinoza's God which is equated with substance is not metaphysical or personal God. It is purely impersonal God. Another core point to be noticed here is that by equating God with Nature Spinoza assigns the all inclusive interrelated systematic and logical identity of nature to God. 'Spinoza says that God you believe in is essentially (if you abstract from all its other qualities) a substance of infinite attributes. The God of the Bible, or of any religion, is truly understood to be a substance of infinite attributes, but is mistakenly represented by human beings to be an anthropomorphic figure who intervenes in human affairs. Spinoza

1. Identification of God with Nature leads Pantheism. The theory-all is God; God is all.

wants to convince you that you should truly understand God as infinite substance, rather than believing in the 'image' of God as portrayed by organised religion.'(Lord 2010, p.32)

According to Spinoza, substance is caused by itself. It is *causa-sui*. Nothing can originate substance. Because substance is envisaged as an interrelated whole into which everything is included. Nothing is excluded from it. It unfolds the truth that substance is the immanent cause of everything else. In essence, substance cannot be ensued by something else but it functions as the basis of everything.

Spinoza initiates his thought with the recognition of unity of all things. Even the truth of all other else is grounded on the all inclusive whole as we observed in our previous analysis. All are incorporated in that one reality. Ultimately, monism is the building block of Spinoza's philosophy on the basis of which he furnishes his further thought.

Śaṅkarācārya's concept of monism

Śaṅkarācārya, the great promoter of Advaita Vedānta, considers ultimate reality as Brahman. The mark of monism advanced by Śaṅkarācārya lies in the explanation where it is stated Brahman is 'Ekam-eva-advitiyam'-one without a second. Moreover, the term 'Advaita', the name applied to this school, contributes a lot in preserving the monistic standard. If we analyse the term 'Advaita' it will be-na dvaita meaning non-dual.

Śaṅkarācārya portrays Brahman from two standpoints-one is higher and the other is lower. Higher Brahman is named as Nirguṇa or Para Brahman and lower Brahman is called Saguna or Aparā Brahman or Isvara. Two divisions of Brahman made by Śaṅkarācārya may raise suspense in the mind of people regarding the monistic character of Śaṅkarācārya's Advaitism. Therefore it is important to highlight that Śaṅkarācārya admits only one reality. In the ultimate sense, the external world even we all are become only the appearance of that one reality. Due to Māyā the world appears. In fact, we are all unreal in the ultimate sense. Even the lower form of Brahman has been degraded as mere appearance. Two layers or grades of

Brahman are not two different kinds of Brahman rather it is the same Brahman or reality which has been from two sides.

The entire philosophy of Śaṅkarācārya owes its origin to the thought of Upanishad. He cannot give up the lower form of Brahman since lower form of Brahman is precisely designed in the Upanishadic scripture by pondering the requirement of mass people. Hence Śaṅkarācārya has to accommodate two grades of reality. But the inner goal of Śaṅkarācārya's philosophy is to establish the one reality-that is Para Brahman. By keeping in view, the basic aim of Sankarite philosophy, present analysis is confined to the elaboration only of higher form of Brahman-Para Brahman.

Śaṅkarācārya describes Para Brahman as Nirguṇa, Nirviśesa and Nirupādhika. The term 'Nirguṇa' denotes the trans-empirical reality of Brahman. Guṇas come out of prakṛti. Brahman being superior to prakṛt cannot be qualified by the production of prakṛti. Hence it is beyond of all qualities. 'This is why Brahman as the ultimate is termed nirguṇa or 'indeterminate', which does not amount to saying as it is ordinarily assumed, that it is nothing, but only means that nothing which the mind can think of can actually belong to it.' (Hiriyanna 1994, p.373) Brahman is without special characteristics. Therefore it is termed as Nirviśesa. Brahman is Nirupādhika. It means that Brahman is free from all adjuncts. It signifies that Brahman is not subjected to the categories of space, time and causations.

Śaṅkarācārya delineated Brahman as Sat(Existence)-Cit(Consciousness)-Anantam (Eternal).¹ According to Śaṅkarācārya, Brahman is indecipherable in the true sense as it is an infinite principle applying any word to which denotes ascribing boundary to it. 'It is real, having authentic being. It never fails to be, since it depends on nothing to preserve it in being. It does not take in anything from outside itself, for then being would include non-being. There is no first or last in it. It does not unfold, express, develop, manifest, grow and change, for it is uniform in nature (ekasara). (Radhakrishnan 2008, p.500)

'Brahman is everything and everything is Brahman. There is no duality, no diversity at all.'(Sharma 1960, p.283) The above stated statement serves as the basic ground for Śaṅkarācārya's Advaitism.

Spinoza's monism VS Śaṅkarācārya's monism

Now the time is to compare Spinoza's monism with Śaṅkarācārya's monism. Before going to the details of it, let us scrutinize how these two thinkers deal with the term 'monism' in respect of their philosophies. In Spinozistic Philosophy, it has been found that the ultimate reality-that is substance is identified with Nature. This identification transforms Spinoza's Philosophy to materialism which is totally absent in Sankarite Philosophy. The presence of materialism in the philosophy of Spinoza influences it to become concrete monism in one sense.² Śaṅkarācārya's philosophy is purely spiritual. As such Śaṅkarācārya's monism retains its abstract character. It becomes clear from it that type of monism held by two thinkers is similar with each other.

1. 'The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad asks as to worship Brahman as Prajñā (Consciousness), as Satyam (Truth), and as Anandam (Bliss).' (Nikhilananda. 1951, p. 36)

2. Identification of the ultimate reality with Nature converts Spinozistic monism to a concrete monism. But the idea of casting the whole world in the geometrical theorem restores the abstract nature of Spinoza's philosophy.

The spark of similarity has been observed in the ways in which both Spinoza and Śāṅkarācārya describes the ultimate reality. Being peculiar substance cannot possess any quality otherwise it will be limited by ascribed quality. This thought of Spinoza resemblances to the Nirguṇa concept of Brahman of Advaita philosophy. Spinoza holds that description of substance has to be done only negatively. Because, according to Spinoza, 'Every determination is negation'. (Masih 2010, p. 225) Suppose if we define the ultimate reality as good then indirectly our definition makes it limited by keeping away the ultimate reality from the quality of bad. So the best way to define the ultimate reality is negation. In the same tune, Śāṅkarācārya says that every word we put in favour of Brahman makes it limited. Therefore, the Upanishadic phrase 'Neti-Neti'-na iti, na iti-Not this, Not this-has been deployed by Śāṅkarācārya to indicate Brahman. Both the philosophers arrive at one univocal conclusion that ultimate reality has to be defined as what is not but not as what it is. Moreover, though monistic thought of Spinozistic philosophy as well as Sankarite philosophy sketches out the ultimate reality negatively but the intended meaning in both the cases is positive. Through this negative description, both the philosophers try to exhibit the ultimate reality as wholly other. We should guard ourselves for not getting involved in the misconception that negative description of the ultimate reality shows it as non-being. In other words, though the ultimate reality in both the philosophies has been documented in negative way but both the philosophers explain it as the most positive reality.

Spinozistic monism epitomized the concept of substance as something eternal. By the application of the term 'eternal' to the concept of substance Spinoza aspires to convey that the whole idea of time is irrelevant to substance. 'As Spinoza is picturing reality through geometrical metaphors, so he conceives of reality as a logical system in which time has no place. Therefore he defines substance as eternal'. (Masih 2010, p.226) As already outlined, Śāṅkarācārya's monism conceives the ultimate reality-Brahman-as Existence-Consciousness and Eternal. Like Spinoza, Śāṅkarācārya also opines that it is inappropriate to connect the ultimate reality to time since there is no beginning or end in it. The concept of ultimate reality to which the term 'eternal' has been deployed here by these two monists is dissimilar to each other. Our further point will discuss the issue in brief.

In accordance with monism advocated by Spinoza, the ultimate reality is a logical interrelated whole. In reality, the core objective of Spinozistic monism is to see the whole world in support of geometrical theorem. Everything of this universe is deduced from this immanent principle. This deduction is like mathematical deduction. 'The problem of the nature of the world is handled by Spinoza like a problem in geometry. Everything is said to

follow from the first principle or ground of the universe as necessarily as the propositions of geometry follow from their logical presuppositions.’ (Thilly 2001, p.321) The fact that everything of this universe has to be followed from the one reality entails the internal division between the ultimate reality (That is cause) and the world(That is effect) which in turn makes Spinoza’s monism sharply distinguished from Śāṅkarācārya’s monism. In Śāṅkarācārya’s monism, no such internal separation has been detected between the ultimate reality-Brahman and the universe. Even cause-effect relation in Śāṅkarācārya’s philosophy is unreal in the true sense. This cause-effect relation is confined to Saguna Brahman. Neither Nirguṇa Brahman nor the universe are treated as cause and effect respectively in Śāṅkarācārya’s monism. As the whole universe is identified with Brahman without any internal division so no question of dragging or deducing can be raised in case of Śāṅkarācārya’s monism. Besides Śāṅkarācārya never considers the ultimate reality as a logical interrelated whole. If we strictly follow the Śāṅkarācārya’s doctrine, we cannot even think of Brahman, the Absolute. Because the moment we think of it, it will be related to the world of experience. Consequently its essence will be contaminated. Silence is the best way to approach Brahman. From this standpoint, all discussion we have made here on Para Brahman is meaningless in one sense.

Conclusion

So far this we have monitored the Spinozistic monism and Śāṅkarācārya’s monism with a comparative vision. After minutely monitoring we can end with this conclusion that in comparison to Spinoza, Śāṅkarācārya is able to retain his monistic position till the end. The notion that substance is an interrelated logical system from which everything is necessarily followed leads Spinoza to admit an internal diversification as we have already noticed. And finally it seems that this diversification displaces Spinoza, to a certain extent, from his monistic outlook.

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The relation between Being and Language in Heidegger's thinking (A commentary on a paragraph from "Introduction to Metaphysics")

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Abstract

This paper approaches the relation between Being and Language in Heidegger's thought taking advantage of a paragraph from *Introduction to Metaphysics* with considering Being and Time also. The considered paragraph is mentioned first, then what we are going to discuss will be depicted, following that, the main body clarifies the mentioned relation.

The Paragraph

The book *Introduction to Metaphysics*¹, published in 1935 is one of the most important works of Heidegger. He himself regarded this series of lectures as what elucidates "The Question of Being"² in his preface to the seventh edition of his 1927 masterwork, *Being and Time*.³ For our specific topic, which is the relation between Language and Being in Heidegger's thought, I personally believe this book is far more appropriate and understandable than any others. Even in *Being and Time*, the essence of language, or the question of the

1. Heidegger, Martin (1935) *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, Max Niemayer Verlag, Tübingen. All quotations from this book are of its English translation: Heidegger, Martin. (2014) *Introduction to Metaphysics* (second edition), translated by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, Yale University Press. It has been cited with pagination for Fried and Polt's translation preceding the pagination for the German. I will cite to this book as "IM".

2. Seinsfrage

3. Heidegger, Martin. (1927) *Sein und Zeit*, Max Niemayer Verlag, Tübingen, 1953. All quotations from this book are of its English translation: Heidegger, Martin. (1996) *Being and Time*, translated by Joan Stambaugh, State University of New York Press. It has been cited with pagination for Stambaugh's translation preceding the pagination for the German. I will cite to this book as "BT".

being of language is not scetched. There we read: “We possess a linguistics, and the being of beings which it has as its theme is obscure; even the horizon for any investigative question about it is veiled.” (BT, p. 155 [166]). *Introduction to Metaphysics* contains four chapters. After addressing the well-known Leibnize’s proposition, “Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?” in the first chapter, Heidegger assigns the whole of chapter two to the grammar and etymology of the word “Being”. The third chapter entitled “The Question of the Essence of Being” which we focus on. The last chapter discusses “The Restriction of Being.” In the middle of the third chapter there is a paragraph which I think can reveal to us what we want. I quote this paragraph from the text:

... Suppose that there were no indeterminate meaning of Being, and that we did not understand what this meaning signifies. Then what? Would there just be one noun and one verb less in our language? No. *then there would be no language at all*. Being as such would no longer open themselves up in words at all; they could no longer be addressed and discussed. For saying beings as such involves understanding beings as beings, that is, their Being, in advance. Presuming that we did not understand Being at all, presuming that the word “Being” did not even have that evanescent meaning, then there would not be any single word at all. We ourselves could never be those who say. We would never be able to be those who we are. For to be human means to be a sayers. Human beings are yes-and no-sayers only because they are, in the ground of their essence, sayers, *the sayers*... (IM, pp. 89-90 [62]) .

What the paragraph says

For Heidegger, the main theme always is *Being*. His method to approach Being is to ask a question, explain it, answer it and then leave us with an open question again. The Question of Being is the question. This question is addressed in his different works in different ways. He opens “Introduction to Metaphysics” by asking this question: “Why are there beings at all instead of nothing? That is the question.” (Ibid, p.I). The above quoted paragraph also seeks Being. What is the “indeterminate meaning of Being”? although we can find out what is this meaning which we all understand, if we look back to the beginning of *Being and Time* it can become quite clear to us. There are three presuppositions which prevent us from asking the question of Being. The third one is this: “3. “Being” is the self-evident concept.” (BT, p. 3 [4]). He adds:

“Being” is used in all knowing and predicating, in every relation to beings and in every relation to oneself, and the expression is understandable “without any further ado.” Everybody understands, “The sky is blue,” “*I am happy*,” and similar statements. But this average comprehensibility only demonstrates the incomprehensibility. It shows that an enigma lies *a priori* in every relation and being toward beings as beings (Ibid).

The indeterminacy that we talked about here can be perceived more concretely paying attention to examples. When we say: “The sky is blue,” what do we really mean by it? Of course, we can reply: “I see the sky is blue”. In saying this we did nothing but taking Being as “seeing”. Meanwhile, others might answer: “I *feel* the sky is blue,” “I know the sky is blue,”... this reveals an interminable vagueness. Being is able to *be taken* physically, chemically, physiologically, psychologically and even poetically. This reveals to us a kind of indefiniteness, indeterminacy, or enigma in Heidegger’s word. Facing such an enigma we have two ways:

1. To flee from answering which leads to a groundless “Relativism”, which strictly speaking, it is impossible to call it “Relativism.” At best it can be mentioned as “chaos”. This is what, although unintentionally, all philosophical thinking has done during the history of western philosophy. However, this is of great importance to know that such a fleeing also has its own legitimacy, but not as an answer to the question of Being, but as what Heidegger calls “Regional Ontology.”
2. Seeking a unique answer which is also able to uncover itself in different ways, while we necessarily “fore-have” it in any kind of approach towards beings and ourselves. The question of Being brings us face to face with such a “fore-having”¹.

Our discussion concerns on the relation between language and Being. Before investigating this relation we need to know what we really mean by the word “Being”. As we saw above the only thing which we initially know about Being is that it is necessarily along with every approach we have toward beings. It is there whether we notice it or not. So, Being is not something we invent or add it to beings. Beings are what they are because of their Being. To understand this in a better way we need to know that we are always standing in a specific relation to Being and this allows us to know beings as beings. What do we mean by that? Does it mean that beside beings there is something else? If yes, then how could it be? Only thing which we see is just beings and not Being. We say: “We only see beings.” The question is this: how this is possible for us to talk about beings without understanding that they are? The fact that we understand that beings are means that we have access to Being, or we are able to understand Being. But this is just the first time we catch a sight of Being, of that which we have always understood. These explanations lead us to another Heideggerian concept: “Ontological difference”. As soon as we notice that we understand Being apart from beings, we know that Being is not a being. It is totally and fundamentally different from beings. Now, what rule plays the language here?

We think, talk, hear, read, ... by language and all these happen in language. That is not

1. Vorhabe

enough. To put it in another way, it is much more right to say that we do all these linguistically¹, because we *are* linguistically. Every essential aspect of our being is connected basically to language. Heidegger says that without having the word “Being” in our language, there would be no language at all. Why? We are able to give numerous examples of nouns, verbs and letters without using “Being” and all its derivatives. The answer is No, we are not. We are able to say beings just because we already have “Being” and its derivatives in our language. We read in the passage that “saying beings as such involves understanding beings as beings, that is, their Being.” It can be said that why we need to understand beings as beings? Is it not possible to say them without identifying them as beings? For example, a laptop, a pen, a desk... all these are what we named them. Then there is no need to say they are beings too, and we actually do not so typically. The relation we meant is manifest here: before saying beings as such and such, they have been understood as beings. Although we usually just say: a desk, but the complete and right way to say it is to say: a desk which is, or an existent desk. It is right about any other ways of Being. When you say: an imaginary desk, you must add a “which is” or “existent” to it. Someone might say an imaginary is just imaginary and not real, then we can not say it is. Only thing which is deliberately forgotten here is the interpretation of Being as “Reality”, while Being can not be restricted to these fictitious concepts.

In the last part of the paragraph our human essence is also on perspective. We are sayers, as Heidegger says. Then Being, Human being and Language are interconnected. In a work² published one year before *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger says: “Perhaps we do not need at all to pose the question concerning language beforehand as a separate one, but can take together human being and language and ask about the human being as the speaking human being.” (LQL, p. 25). We always forget that when we talk about “Being”, we are not talking about an object, if we understand object in its right meaning, that is, something which we project on. Being is always and have been there. Taking thinking serious and concrete, we need to ask this question: if I have not understood myself as who I *am*, a sayer, how could I write a paper? But when we are asked such a question, what immediately comes to our mind is that Being can not be something just subjective. We are sayers, whether we become aware of it or leave it unrecognized. But such an answer leads us back to presupposition we quoted above from *Being and Time*: “Being is the self-evident concept” and as we explained not only that Being is not evident in any sense, it is initially almost totally hidden.

1. I could not find any other appropriate word here. «lingually» or «linguistically» completely distort what I mean.

2. Heidegger, Martin (1934) *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache*, Vittorio Klostermann. Frankfurt am Main, 1998. All quotations from this book are of its English translation: Heidegger, Martin. (2009) *Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language*, translated by Wanda Torres Gregory and Yvonne Unna, State University of New York Press. It has been cited as “LQL”.

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Socratic Ethics, Metaethics and Platonic Metaphysics

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Abstract

Our paper aims to analyze the ethical claims (mostly in their formal components) presents in the first Platonic dialogues – also called the “Socratic Dialogues”. In doing this, we intend to show how these ethical claims are hypothetical. Following this, we’ll also, following Anscombe, defend that there’s no room for moral duty in this ethical theory. Next, we’ll focus on how Plato can answer the *is-ought* problem. Last but not least, we’ll show how, according to a important doctrine of Platonic Metaphysics, this ethical theory (and any ethical theory that intends to be universal and necessary) needs a Metaphysical basis.

“Developmentalism”, at least in the Anglo-Saxon Academia, is “the orthodoxy of (...) Platonic Studies” (NAILS, 1993, p 273). A developmentalist sustains that there is a significant development in Plato’s thought and, therefore, it’s possible to divide Plato’s dialogues into, at least, “three distinct chronological periods-early, middle, and late” (GERSON, 2002, p. 85).

The first group of dialogues-the Early Dialogues-is commonly called the “Socratic Dialogues”. According to Penner (PENNER, 1992, p. 124), these are the Socratic dialogues: Hippias Minor, Charmides, Laches, Protagoras, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Ion, Gorgias, Meno; Lysis, Euthydemus, Menexenus, Hippias Major, Republic I. However, the Gorgias and the Meno, although Socratic, contain some Pythagorean elements-being, therefore, transitional. Following Vlastos (VLASTOS, 1991, p. 47, 161), most developmentalists

(if not all) defend that, in the Socratic Dialogues, Plato's main concern is ethics.

This present paper aims to analyze some ethical affirmations that Plato makes about ethics in the Socratic Dialogues and its relations with Metaethics and Metaphysics. Therefore, we'll not only engage with Plato's thought with a historical interest, but, also, with a philosophical interest: what would Plato say about some of our currently philosophical questions? We'll focus in the Socratic Dialogues and, therefore, we'll work within a developmentalist view (although we have some problems with it). However, Aristotle's testimony and some of Plato's later dialogues will, also, be explored.

Platonic Ethics in the Socratic Dialogues is usually reconstructed by an appeal to the Socratic Paradoxes: no one does what's bad (for him) willingly (prudential paradox) and no one does what's unjust willingly (moral paradox). However, this explains what Plato says about ethics. Our intent, on the other hand, is not explaining what he says, but explaining how he says: we want to analyze its formal components, not its material ones.

There's no better text to show the structure of Plato's ethical claims in these dialogues than the Euthydemus 282a:

Then let us consider what follows: since we all wish to be happy, and since we appear to become so by using things and using them rightly, and since knowledge was the source of rightness and good fortune, it seems to be necessary that every man should prepare himself by every means to become as wise as possible-or isn't this the case?¹

In this passage, Socrates makes some claims. First, all men wish to be happy (P1). Second, "a man can only be happy [become happy] by using things rightly" (P2). Third, "a man needs wisdom to use things rightly" (P3). The fourth claim is a consequence of P2 and P3: "a man needs wisdom to be happy" (P4). From P1 and P4, we get the conclusion: "all man should become as wise as possible" (C).

It's clear that C is not a categorical imperative-a moral claim in the sense we would understand nowadays. Actually, to use Kantian terms, the Ethics of the Socratic Dialogues doesn't have categorical imperatives-the imperatives of morality (KANT, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, IV, 416). There are only hypothetical imperatives, the ones that "represent the practical necessity of a possible action as a means to attain something else which one wills (or which it is possible that one might will)" (KANT, 2002, p. 30)². Socrates never says "you have to do X" (at least not in the sense a modern would understand it), he only says: "IF you want to be happy, you should do X". And "the imperative that refers to the choice of means to one's own happiness, i.e., the precept of prudence, is always hypothetical" (KANT, 2002, pp. 32-33)³.

1. PLATO, 1997, p. 719.

2. *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, IV, 414.

3. *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, IV, 416.

C is, obviously, a hypothetical imperative and a special kind: a counsel of prudence. The idea expressed by C is that if you want to be happy, you should become as wise as possible (because this is the better, or only way, to be happy). And, according to P1, the hypothesis applies to everyone. Therefore, everyone should become as wise as possible.

To make our claim clearer let's compare C with two premises. The first one is a moral one (M): "Thou shalt not kill" (or you ought not to kill). The second one is a practical tip (Pt): "If you want to bake this cake, you should follow the recipe". It's evident that C is closer to Pt-a hypothetical imperative. The only difference is that not everyone wants to bake this cake, but everyone wants to be happy (according to P1). The difference is material, not formal.

With this reconstruction, we're forced to conclude, with Penner, that there's no room for norms and values in the ethics of the Early Dialogues. That is, there's no room for the notion of moral obligation, moral duty or a moral sense of "ought"-actually, this, according to Anscombe (ANSCOMBE, 1958, pp. 1-19) is a difference between Ancient Ethics and Modern Moral Philosophy.

And, with this in mind, it's clear that this ethical theory avoids the naturalistic fallacy and is able to give a clear answer to "is-ought" problem: there's no derivation of "ought" (in a moral sense) from any "is" claim. Of course, Socrates can say that we ought to be wise. But this has the same structure as our Pt statement: "if you want to bake this cake, you should (ought) follow the recipe". It's evident that Pt isn't a moral claim (this ought doesn't express the notion of moral duty) and, therefore, we're not before a case of naturalistic fallacy. And, if this is true, the same applies to C: "if you want to be happy, you ought to be wise".

In a Platonic point of view, however, this theory is incomplete. We can reconstruct this ethics saying that C is true, because wisdom (knowledge) is sufficient and necessary for happiness or because any other explanation. Once more, we're facing a formal problem, not a material one. To understand this, we need to remember an important doctrine of Platonic Metaphysics.

Aristotle¹, writing about the development of Plato's Theory of Ideas, says:

For, having in his [Plato's] youth first become familiar with Craylus and with the Heraclitean doctrines (that all sensible things are ever in a state of flux and there is no knowledge about them), these views he held even in later years. Socrates, however, was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions; Plato accepted his teaching, but held that the problem applied no to sensible things but to entities of another kind-for this reason, that the common definition could not be

1. We're following Ross's translation: ARISTOTLE, 1908.

a definition of any sensible things as they were always changing. Things of this other sort, then, he called Ideas (Met. 987b30-987a10)

The supporters of the ideal theory were led to it because on the question about the truth of things they accepted the Heraclitean saying which describe all sensible things as ever passing away, so that if knowledge or thought is to have an object, there must be some other and permanent entities, apart from those which are sensible; for there could be no knowledge of things which were in a state of flux (Met. 1078b)

Here, we have a clear statement of a distinct feature of Platonic Metaphysics: the notion that sensible things cannot be object of knowledge (or, at least, true knowledge). This important doctrine can be seen in some dialogues and in the works of modern scholars:

What is that which always is and has no becoming, and what is that which becomes but never is? The former is grasped by understanding, which involves a reasoned account. It is unchanging. The latter is grasped by opinion, which involves unreasoning sense perception (Timaeus 27e-28a¹)

SOCRATES: So such a person [one who studs nature] assumes the task of dealing, not with things eternal, but with what comes to be, will come to be, or has come to be?

PROTARCHUS: Undeniably.

SOCRATES: So how could we assert anything definite about these matters with exact truth if it never did possess nor will possess nor now possesses any kind of sameness?

PROTARCHUS: Impossible.

SOCRATES: And how could we ever hope to achieve any kind of certainty about subject matters that do not in themselves possess any certainty? PROTARCHUS: I see no way.

SOCRATES: Then there can be no reason or knowledge that attains the highest truth about these subjects! (Philebus, 59a-b²)

Since there is such a thing science, Plato inferred that the objects which science defines, and about which she undertakes to prove universally valid conclusions, cannot be the, indefinitely variable things of the sensible physical world (TAYLOR, 1908, p. 39)

Only true being is truly knowable; the sensible world, that is a mixture of being and nonbeing, is only opinable (REALE, 1990, p. 52)

With this in mind, we can go back to or analysis of C and its justification. Without a Metaphysical background, what's the nature of any ethical claim? We can safely assume that, if there's no Metaphysical foundations for an ethical theory, there's no such thing as ethical knowledge: there's only opinion. In other words, if C is a claim that is derived by sensible experience, C doesn't constitute knowledge.

1. PLATO, 1997, p. 1234.

2. PLATO, 1997, p. 448.

Even if C is true, we cannot defend that C is always true – and this is applied to any ethical claim. The reason is that from sensible things (particulars) we can never get a necessary (universal) conclusion. If Socrates says that the reason that it's necessary to be wise to be happy is because we can see that wisdom leads to happiness, we can safely say: I never saw one person that is happy that isn't wise, but I can't safely affirm that wisdom is necessary to happiness. Socrates needs to show us the necessary relation between happiness and wisdom.

This problem becomes more important when we see that the what Socrates says about happiness depends on a problematic premise. Someone can say to Socrates that “since we all desire to be happy and, sometimes, injustice can make us happy, we should, sometimes, be unjust (injustice is the best path to happiness in some case)”. In this *Early Dialogues* (see the *Gorgias*), however, Socrates defends “the doctrine that it is never in one's interest to harm, or do injustice to, others” (PENNER, 1992, p. 136).

To sustain this doctrine, Socrates cannot say that “given human nature and the ways of the world, the life of crime is not likely to be a happy one in the long run” (GERSON, 2013, p. 43): it's clear that the “never” in the doctrine cannot be derived from the not “likely” of the explanation. It's also impossible for Socrates to defend our P2 (“a man can only be happy [become happy] by using things rightly”) appealing to sensible things. And, since we can't get necessary truths from sensible “knowledge”, the only way to have an objective (necessary and universal) ethical theory is to an appeal to Metaphysics.

Going beyond the sensible world, we can find the necessary truths that can give C its justification. By dialectics, we can analyze human nature (and the human soul) in itself and, truly, knowing ourselves. Doing this, we'll realize that the human soul has its parts and, consequently, each part has its own virtue (excellence). The highest part of our soul is the one that enables us to know the necessary truths: the rational part. And it's clear that the excellence of the rational part is wisdom.

We can, also, see that what we call excellence for the human being is a state where our soul attains what's good for it (for us). And, a different way to say “a state where we get what's good for us” is happiness (*eudaimonia*). Therefore, because of the nature of our soul, there is a necessary connection between wisdom (the virtue of one part of our soul) and happiness (the state where we have what's good for us, virtues). And this necessary connection, that explains the necessary claim of C (and of all ethical claims), is only possible thanks to a Metaphysical Theory-without a Second Sailing (that is, inside a materialistic/naturalistic worldview), there's no such thing as ethical knowledge.

In this short paper, we analyzed the structure of the ethics on the “Socratic Dialogues”-showing that all ethical claims are hypothetical and that they all follow from the premise that “every man wants to be happy”. Next, it was showed how this construct avoids the

naturalistic fallacy-since there's no room for "moral duty". In the end, we showed how, in a Platonic point of view, this ethical theory (and any ethical theory that aspires objectivity and necessity in its claims) needs Metaphysics.

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